Consequences of Feeder Delays for the Success of A380 Operations by Koch, Benjamin et al.
Journal of Air Transportation  Vol. 11, No. 1 -2006 
  
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF FEEDER DELAYS FOR THE 
SUCCESS OF A380 OPERATIONS  
 
Jens Ruehle 
University of Cologne 
 
Bjoern Goetsch 
University of Cologne 
Cologne, Germany 
 
Benjamin Koch 
Lufthansa Consulting GmbH 
Cologne, Germany 
ABSTRACT 
Due to existing slot and infrastructure constraints at international hub-and-spoke 
airports, an increase in feeder traffic seems only possible if larger feeder aircraft are 
used. Using a case study of Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt International 
Airport, three possible A380 routes (Beijing, Tokyo-Narita, Los Angeles) were 
examined to assess the extent to which delays of feeder traffic may impact the 
economic performance of very large aircraft. On the basis of today’s delays and 
anticipated traffic growth in the future, we found that between 9.5% and 13.5% of 
connecting passengers are unable to transfer to their respective intercontinental 
flights. In addition, the results demonstrate that a further increase in delays can be 
detrimental to the profitable operation of very large aircraft, as demonstrated by two 
out of three simulated routes. We suggest options for airlines operating very large 
aircraft to counteract the negative impacts of feeder delays. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction of the A380, airlines need to fill a larger plane 
with more passengers to achieve profitability (Pilling, 2005a; Thompson, 
2005a). Due to existing slot and infrastructure constraints at international 
hub-and-spoke airports, an increase in feeder traffic only seems possible if 
larger feeder aircraft are used. Delays of these larger aircraft and, thus the 
possibility of missing a connecting A380 flight, could impact profitability. 
Since traffic volume at secondary feeder airports and air route congestion are 
likely to increase, the risk of delays is expected to grow. 
Recent research into delays in air transportation has identified: (a) 
reasons behind air traffic delays (Mayer & Sinai, 2003); (b) reasons behind 
airport delays (Hansen, 2002; Reynolds-Feighan & Button, 1999); (c) airline 
recovery policies (Rosenberger et al., 2002); and (d) implications for 
policymakers (Golaszewski, 2002). However, the impact of feeder delays on 
airline profitability has not been a prominent topic in the literature so far. We 
argue that for airlines operating very large aircraft, such as the A380 in a 
hub-and-spoke environment, the increasing level of air traffic delays may 
become a critical issue in terms of scheduling and profitability. 
In this paper, we simulate the effects of feeder delays on A380 
operations using a case study of Lufthansa German Airline (LH) at Frankfurt 
International Airport (FRA) to assess implications on load factors and 
profitability. Based on our findings, we suggest a set of possible 
countermeasures which may alleviate the negative effects of feeder delays. 
THE ROLE OF FEEDER DELAYS FOR THE SUCCESS OF MEGA-
CARRIER OPERATIONS 
The hub-and-spoke philosophy 
To a large extent air traffic on intercontinental routes is organized 
according to the hub-and-spoke system. Instead of having several point-to-
point connections, a hub-and-spoke network is based on the idea of 
bundling. All connections are routed over the respective airline hub in order 
to bundle incoming and outgoing airline passengers and to reallocate them 
via the hub airport. This technique enables the airlines to cover significantly 
more markets with the same amount of flights than would be covered within 
a point-to-point network structure (Auerbach & Delfmann, 2005). In 
addition, a hub-and-spoke network leads to economies of scope and, 
consequently, to cost savings arising from increased load-factors between the 
hub-to-hub connections (Pompl, 2002). The downside of the hub-and-spoke 
philosophy is the higher complexity in terms of scheduling feeding flights to 
and connecting flights from the hub airport. Since incoming and outgoing 
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patterns at hubs are organized in highly complex and interdependent waves,1 
the minimum connecting time (MCT) becomes a highly relevant issue. The 
MCT specifies the period of time that is allowable at the airport to transfer 
passengers and luggage between flights.2 Thus, incoming traffic which does 
not meet the MCT will not be available to fill the aircraft of the outgoing 
wave. Given this situation, it becomes obvious that major airline hubs rely 
heavily on punctual feeding traffic to be able to profitably organize their 
scheduled operations. 
On most routes, the new Airbus A380 will require an efficiently 
operating hub-and-spoke network since the local traffic is insufficient to fill 
planes at profitable levels. The efficiency of such a hub-and-spoke system is 
challenged for two reasons: (a) massive increase in capacity through A380 
operations, and (b) rising level of traffic delays. The combination of both 
factors will have negative impacts on A380 operations. 
 
The capacity issue 
Depending on the outlay, an A380 aircraft may provide 130 more seats 
than an average Boeing 747-400 aircraft.3 With a seating capacity of 550 
seats and an average break-even load factor of 70%, 385 seats need to be 
filled in order to reach profitability. Thus, a load factor of 70% for the new 
mega-carrier A380 is equivalent to a 100% load factor of the current 
flagship, the B747-400, with about 390 seats. 
A distinction can be made between three sources of additional passenger 
volume (in a hub-and-spoke network). The first and most likely option is the 
utilization of larger feeder aircraft coming from destinations with higher 
passenger potential (e.g., for the Frankfurt case from other major airports 
such as Amsterdam, Paris or Madrid). Thus, these origin and destination 
(O/D) pairs will become increasingly more important as they provide a 
larger percentage of feeding traffic to the hub. Consequently, a cancellation 
or delay of one of these major feeders causes a profitability problem for the 
airlines since a significant portion of passengers for the outgoing A380 
aircraft is missing. 
                                                 
1  The term wave or bank describes the bundled incoming or outgoing traffic (i.e., 
group of flights), which is designed to allow for a seamless and efficient transfer 
between flights, whereas the combination of an incoming and the following outgoing 
wave is referred to as a complex (Holloway, 2003).  
2  The minimum connecting time differs from airport to airport depending on various 
criteria such as airport layout, capacity, congestion levels, etc. (Hanlon, 1999). 
3  See Pilling, 2005b, p. 44. Compared to the planned LH configuration with 550 
seats (see Thompson, 2005b, p. 11) an A380 provides additional capacity for even 
160 passengers. 
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The second option would be to increase frequencies and, thus, to bring 
in a larger number of feeder flights before the departure of the mega carrier. 
The implications of this alternative are twofold. First, scheduling and 
coordination complexity increases as the new flights have to be linked with 
the overall schedule and the additional passenger and baggage volume must 
be handled accordingly. Second, the connectivity ratio4 decreases as the 
waiting time for those passengers who arrive in earlier waves becomes 
longer compared to the existing status quo. Probably the strongest arguments 
against this option are the existing slot scarcity and capacity constraints at 
major hub airports. 
The last option would be to increase the catchment area of the respective 
hub, that is, its originating traffic. For example, FRA is trying to attract more 
passengers by linking the airport to the German high-speed train network. 
This seems to be a very reasonable option as the originating traffic is usually 
less vulnerable to punctuality issues. However, this option leads to a 
significant financial investment compared to its observable impact on 
passenger numbers.  
Due to the problems described above, airlines at major hub airports will 
probably need to rely on the option of larger aircraft to feed their flights. 
 
Effects of air traffic delays on airline profitability 
Accurate data on delays became widely available in the late 1990s 
when the Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA) at EUROCONTROL 
was established. CODA publishes monthly delay reports.5 However, the 
available data does not reveal a clear long-term trend as the statistics have 
been strongly influenced by various external factors.6 Referring to the data 
from the past two years—which can be considered as being relatively 
unbiased—there is strong evidence that the level of delays will increase in 
the future. Compared to 2003 the average delay per movement (ADM) used 
as an indicator for the overall level of delays, increased by 4.9% to 10.4 
minutes for arrivals in 2004 (CODA, 2004). The data from the first eight 
                                                 
4   The connectivity ratio refers to “the degree to which linkages are more than purely 
random” at hub airports (Doganis, 2002, p. 258). 
5  These reports are mainly based on data reported by the Association of European 
Airlines, by the Central Flow Management Units at EUROCONTROL, and by the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA). 
6  Among these effects was the Balkan war in 1998/99 which contributed to a 
significant increase in air traffic delays due to severe military action in Europe 
(+29.2% in 1999). In contrast, other incidents with global implications such as the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 (-27.0% in 2002), and the SARS epidemic in 2003 (-7.0% in 
2003) which lead to a major decrease in air traffic delays since the overall traffic 
volume decreased drastically. 
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months of 2005 shows an ADM of 10.8 minutes for arrivals, which represent 
an increase of 3.8% compared to 2004 (CODA, 2005). 
Each passenger who misses a connecting flight due to delays of feeding 
aircraft reduces the profit of an airline.7 In the worst case scenario, the 
number of delayed passengers is so high that the outgoing aircraft does not 
reach its break-even load factor.8 
In summary, the combination of both the capacity increase due to the 
introduction of the A380 and the increasing level of flight delays have 
significant effects on the overall profitability of airline operations. Although 
not all of the described effects are unique to the A380 case, the mega carrier 
takes the stated problem areas into another dimension compared to the B747 
level. 
SAMPLING AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The data 
Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt International Airport as a case 
study 
LH is the largest carrier in Germany and one of the leading carriers in 
Europe. With a total order volume of 15 A380 as of 2005, LH is currently 
the second most important customer for the new Airbus A380—topped only 
by Emirates Airlines of Dubai. LH’s main home base is FRA in Germany, 
Continental Europe’s largest airport. In 2004, FRA served over 51 million 
passengers, handled about 1.8 million tons of cargo and operated 
approximately 480,000 aircraft movements. It currently ranks number seven 
among the world’s largest passenger airports and is one of the world’s most 
important intercontinental hubs. This traffic was achieved with the help of a 
three runway system.9 FRA is operating almost entirely at congestion levels, 
which makes it one of the most slot constrained airports in Europe.  
                                                 
7   Experts already claim that due to the high level of delays a reliable operation of 
European hubs cannot be ensured (Klingenberg, 2001). 
8  The respective no-show passenger due to feeder delays leads to compensation 
payments and reduces the number of available seats on later flights to the respective 
destination. 
9  Of the currently available three runways one is only open for take-offs, which 
results in bottlenecks during peak-hours for landing aircraft. The construction of a 
fourth runway, which would be open only for landings, has been slowed-down by 
long-term political and security discussions. 
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The demand data 
A selection of the most probable routes has been chosen on which LH 
plans to operate the A380.10 For these routes historic demand figures were 
analyzed and projected for the first year of permanent operation of the A380 
in 2008. 
The data set was mainly compiled from booking data from the airline 
Global Distribution Systems, which was then adjusted with various 
correction factors to account for missing bookings (e.g., own sales of the 
airline) as well as for itineraries not flown. These calibration processes 
resulted in true passenger demand figures for 2004, the total being 
approximately 73,000 passengers. All analyses were performed on a true 
O/D basis. A total of 4,587 itineraries were considered. All data was 
analyzed for a typical week, that is, a week that did not show specific peaks 
or off-peaks due to major sports events, vacation traffic or holiday 
downturns. Weekday specific variations were balanced out by including all 
traffic days and by not neglecting the typically higher (e.g., Monday) or 
lower (e.g., Thursday) traffic days. 
Demand for 2008 was forecasted by applying country-related specific 
forecasts to each sector covered in the data set. Thus, the current IATA 
international passenger forecasts were applied to each single relation (e.g., 
Germany-to-Japan or South Africa-to-United States), resulting in a 
calculated demand for each relation.11 The result is a forecast demand table 
for the potential A380 routes, reflecting not only the expected future traffic 
development of the German market, but also of each respective single 
country-to-country market. In total, 1,188 country pairs were analyzed and 
projected to 2008 demand levels, resulting in a total demand of about 90,000 
passengers for the sample week. 
 
The supply data 
For the selected routes an evaluation of the current LH operating 
patterns was performed. Also, for a set of 8 routes—covering several Asian 
and North American destinations, as well as Johannesburg—a deeper 
analysis was performed covering several weeks in 2004. Thus, the past 
passenger numbers on the specific flights were evaluated to again verify the 
general demand data generated in an earlier step. This made it possible to 
determine real load factors during the research period, which have been used 
to develop possible operating patterns for 2008. We presuppose that the 
                                                 
10  Currently, about 15-20 potential destinations are being discussed as potential 
A380 destinations from FRA. These include airports in Asia, the Middle East, North 
America and South Africa. 
11   For those country pairs that were not covered in the IATA forecast, an average 
growth rate for the respective regions was applied. 
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current load factors are a benchmark which will also be reached by the 
A380. 
We discuss the results of our study for three of those eight routes, 
namely FRA-to-Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK), FRA-to-Tokyo 
Narita International Airport (NRT) and FRA-to-Los Angeles International 
Airport (LAX). These destinations do not only represent routes to different 
geographical regions, they are also representative of fast developing markets 
such as East Asia and China as well as the more saturated North American 
market, and are therefore the best examples for further discussion within the 
context of this paper. Based on the previous findings, several potential 
operating patterns were evaluated, using typical service patterns as a basis 
and the identified past seat load factors. 
Table 1. Case study base data, Lufthansa German Airlines at Frankfurt 
International Airport (FRA) to three destinations 
Number of itineraries considered 4,587 
Number of country pairs analyzed and projected to 2008 1,188 
Total number of feeder origin airports 166 
Total number of analyzed feeder flights 97,035 
To Beijing Capital International Airport (PEK): 
To Tokyo-Narita International Airport (NRT): 
To Los Angeles International Airport (LAX): 
15,678 
17,892 
16,039 
 
To distribute the forecasted passenger demand—which in our case study 
accounts for the demand of a total week—amongst a specific number of 
flights within this week, it was necessary to define the operational pattern for 
the destinations in question. This allows us to evaluate respective load 
factors and the profitability situation of each single flight. 
It was assumed that any operation below 7/7 (daily flights) would be 
inadequate, while any pattern above 14/7 (twice daily) for the A380 seemed 
unrealistic. Additionally, patterns of 10/7 and 12/7 were analyzed, both of 
which reflect typical standard operational models in the industry. A 12/7 
pattern reflects daily flights accompanied by second flights each working 
day, while the 10/7 operational pattern consists of a daily flight along with a 
second flight every other weekday. For these calculations, the expected 
capacity of the A380 of 550 in the standard LH layout was used.12  
                                                 
12  It is important to realize that five A380 flights account for the same number of 
capacity offered per week as a daily B747-400 flight with 390 seats per flight. Thus, 
from a capacity point of view the 12/7 scenario is equivalent in terms of offered 
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A scenario combining two A380 flights on peak days with one A380 
flight and one B747-400 flight on low-demand days has not been considered 
due to the operational complexity and costs of such an operational pattern. 
The flight deck and cabin crews do not usually hold the type rating for such 
different aircraft types but operate either the Boeing or the Airbus fleet. A 
mixed operation based on an alternation of both aircraft types therefore 
results in the need to account for longer layovers for the crews at the 
destination and thus considerably higher crew costs. These are accompanied 
by the need to provide technical crews and spare parts for both aircraft types 
at each destination—directly or indirectly by using partner companies. 
Nevertheless, both approaches of guaranteeing reliable operations from the 
technical point of view result in additional costs. In sum, the mentioned facts 
seem to make a mixed operation an unfavorable option which has therefore 
been disregarded in our analyses. 
Based on the current operations as offered by LH on the FRA-to-PEK 
and FRA-to-NRT routes, we feel that the 12/7 pattern of A380 operations is 
the preferred option for analyzing the situation in 2008. The generated 
demand figures for 2008, reflecting the high-growth markets in South-East 
Asia, support that decision. For FRA-to-LAX, one of the gateways to the far 
more saturated North American air transport market, a 7/7 operational 
pattern was considered, offering a single daily A380 flight. 
 
The delay data 
While the route specific traffic forecasts are a means of identifying 
potential A380 markets, this study focuses on an analysis of the impact of 
delays of feeder flights on the success of such operations. Thus, to provide a 
basis for our scenarios a comprehensive analysis of past delays at FRA was 
undertaken. All relevant feeder flights, identified in the booking data as 
linking the true origins of the passengers with FRA, were selected for the 
year 2004. For the three chosen destinations, a total of 166 origin airports 
had to be considered, leading to a total of 97,035 flights from these airports 
to FRA in 2004. For those flights the respective actual delays for each single 
day of the year were collected.  
Only those flights which had a scheduled arrival time of between 2 
hours and 45 minutes before the scheduled time of departure of the long-haul 
flight were selected for our simulation. The total number of feeder flights 
relevant for these analyses was 15,678 for FRA-to-PEK, 16,039 for FRA-to-
LAX and 17,892 for FRA-to-NRT. We assume that existing waves and bank 
patterns will also be kept for the introduction of the A380. We also assume 
that it will be possible to maintain the current minimum connecting time of 
                                                                                                        
capacity to the combination of a daily A380 flight with a daily B747-400 flight on the 
same route or the currently used 14/7 pattern employing B747-400. 
 Ruehle, Goetsch and Koch 51 
 
 
45 minutes at FRA and that every itinerary including a missed connection 
time of more than 2 hours is not likely to experience critical delays in terms 
of missed connections.13 If a feeder connection had more than one feeding 
flight, we thus attributed 50% of the respective passengers to the last arriving 
feeder flight. The remaining 50% were equally distributed between the 
earlier flights. 
A distinction can be made between two classes of feeder flights. The 
first class is typical short- and medium-haul flights within Germany and 
Europe, of up to 2.5 hours of total flying time. These account for the 
majority of feeder flights in any typical hub structure. The second class is 
intercontinental feeder flights. These long-haul flights serve passengers who 
have to transfer at the hub between two intercontinental flights, thus only 
remaining on the European continent for a change of aircraft, for example, a 
connection from Dubai-to-LAX. Table 2 summarizes the data taken into 
account for our analyses. 
However, the descriptive data also reveals that the proportion of 
simulated feeder passengers differs for the selected destinations. While 
92.2% (FRA-to-PEK) and 83.9% (FRA-to-NRT) of all feeder passengers are 
included in the simulation, for the FRA-to-LAX connection only 68.5% of 
the feeder passengers will be simulated. This shows that a large percentage 
of passengers connecting to LAX arrive at FRA early enough to allow for 
delays of their respective feeder aircraft, thus they do not miss connecting 
flights. Hence, it can be expected that the FRA-to-LAX flight tends to be 
less affected by profitability problems which may arise due to feeder delays. 
The results are previous punctuality patterns for each feeder flight 
within 2 hours and the minimum connecting time before the A380 departure 
for the three selected routes. Together with the demand data which was 
developed earlier, these results form the basis of our scenarios for the 
evaluation of changes in the delay situation and their impact on the 
operations of the A380. Differentiating between level 1 (non-coordinated 
airport), level 2 (schedules facilitated airport), and level 3 (fully coordinated 
airport) airports,14 our analysis shows varying levels of delays for feeders 
coming from these destinations. We see an ADM of 9.96 minutes for level 1, 
9.32 minutes for level 2, and 12.13 minutes for level 3 airports, that is, the 
                                                 
13  Experience shows, that almost 95% of all flights are booked from the first screen 
on the computer reservation systems, which are arranged by total travel time. With 
longer transit times at hub airports, the flights switch to the following screen pages 
and thus are more unlikely to be booked. 
14  The basis for our classification is the structure used by IATA in their World 
Scheduling Guidelines. Thus, we distinguish between fully coordinated (level 3), 
schedule facilitated (level 2) and non coordinated (level 1) airports. See IATA, 2005. 
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delays at hub airports (level 3) are 2.17 and 2.81 minutes higher compared to 
lower level airports, respectively. 
Table 2. Descriptive data of chosen flights analyzed for case study: Lufthansa German 
Airlines at Frankfurt International Airport (FRA) to 3 destinations 
 FRA-to-Beijing 
Capital 
International 
Airport (PEK)  
FRA-to-
Tokyo-Narita 
International 
Airport (NRT) 
FRA-to-Los 
Angeles 
International 
Airport (LAX) 
Passengers per week 5214.7 5369.6 3142.8 
Chosen operating patterns 12/7 12/7 7/7 
Envisaged load factor 79.0 % 81.4 % 81.6 % 
Percentage of connecting passengers 55.1 % 63.1 % 63.2 % 
Total feeder passengers 239.29 282.22 283.72 
Simulated feeder passengers 220.60 236.81 194.47 
Proportion of simulated feeder 
passengers 
92.2% 83.9% 68.5% 
Number of simulated feeding flights 164 171 146 
Time of departure 4:20 pm 11:45 am 11:30 am 
 
 
The simulation model 
The number of transported passengers for each A380 flight is the sum of 
all connecting passengers arriving prior to a specified minimum connecting 
time of 45 minutes and the passengers originating at the hub airport. The past 
delays are incorporated into the model by constructing empirical delay 
distributions. Our model uses these empirical delay distributions and 
attempts to determine whether feeder flights transfer their respective 
connecting passengers to one single A380 flight, the same being repeated for 
j simulation runs with j=1,…..,M. We then calculate the difference between 
the potential transferring passengers and the average simulated amount of 
passengers boarding the A380 as well as the percentage of simulated flights 
not reaching the break-even load factor. 
Each feeder flight is scheduled to arrive at a particular time hi of the day, 
with i=1,…,N representing the set of feeder flights.15 The number of 
connecting passengers pi is deterministic, derived as described in the 
                                                 
15  Arrival times were taken from current schedules, which are timed to feed the 
current B747-400 operations on the routes analyzed. 
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paragraph above. Frequencies for A380 legs were determined by comparing 
total traffic demand per week with resulting estimated load factors of a 
chosen frequency, as well as with current frequency levels of B747-400 
operations. This led to the aforementioned operating pattern of 12 flights per 
week to the Asian destinations (PEK and NRT) analyzed and a daily flight to 
LAX. 
Given a departure time HA380 for one A380 operation, we can then 
calculate individual cut-off times ti in minutes for each feeder flight after its 
scheduled arrival time:  
 
iAi hHt −−= )45( 380 .    (1) 
We introduce the delay time jid ,  which represents the number of 
minutes feeder flight i arrives after its scheduled arrival time hi at run j with j 
= 1,…..,M and 0, Ν∈jid  . We assume that delays jid , are independent of 
each other. Thus we can define an index variable for each feeder flight, 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>
≤=
iji
iji
ji td
td
y
,
,
, 0
1
    (2) 
 
giving us connecting passengers pi if iji td ≤, , or resulting in the loss of 
connection, if iji td >, . 
As delay times vary significantly for each feeder flight depending on 
the airport of origin (hub, secondary, regional) and stage length, we find 
different empirical distributions )~(~ ii dF , with id
~
 as the observed past 
delays for each feeder carrier i. These were then transferred into discrete 
empirical distribution functions to facilitate further programming. Class 
width was chosen to be 5 minutes and total number of classes is 21. The 
upper limit of 120 minutes of delay was set for the last class as well as the 
larger class width of 25 minutes to represent an upper bound. 
We use the Monte Carlo simulation to make inferences about the 
number of people reaching the specified A380 at one single flight by 
simulating a random number ui,j, which is uniformly distributed between [0, 
1]: 
]1,0[,1,1 ,....., Uuu MjNiji ←====    (3) 
 
and gives us the simulated delay time 
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jijii duF ,,
1 ˆ)(~ =−    (4) 
for any feeder flight i for run j. Hence, the number of passengers which 
reaches the specified A380 flight at one single run j: 
)(ˆ
1
,
380 ∑
=
⋅=
N
i
jii
A
j ypp         (5) 
The number of simulated runs M was chosen to be 5000 to gain robust 
results for the A380 distribution, which resulted in 
 
)()(ˆ~)ˆ,.....,ˆ( 3803803805000
380
1
AASimAA pFpFpp ≈  (6) 
 
for each destination. 
This approach simulates the status quo delay scenario with today’s delay 
patterns when applied to feeders with forecasted passenger numbers. 
However, this does not incorporate an expected further tightening of the 
congestion situation, due to airport and air route congestion which will 
ultimately result in higher delays for feeder carriers. Therefore we assume 
different growth rates for the different classified IATA types of airports. 
Adjustments to the empirical delay distributions were performed as depicted 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Adjustments to the empirical delay distributions for the different classified types 
of airports  
Scenario 
Fully Coordinated 
Airports 
(Level 3) 
Schedules 
Facilitated Airports 
(Level 2) 
Non Coordinated 
Airports 
(Level 1) 
Status Quo Current status Current status Current status 
Most likely + 4 minutes / flight + 2 minutes / flight Current status 
Worst Case + 8 minutes / flight + 4 minutes / flight + 2 minutes / flight 
 
For example, past observations of d~ for Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 
airport, a level 3 airport, were adjusted in the most likely scenario by adding 
4 minutes to each observation CDGd
~
. This, in turn, leads to a right-hand shift 
of the empirical density functions for each feeder. This approach is an 
attempt to adjust the assumed growth rates of congestion at different types of 
airports which ultimately leads to a further delay of the feeder to the A380 
outgoing airport. The most likely scenario shows our hypothesis for 2008 
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under the assumption that no policy changes and/or schedule measures are 
made. The worst case scenario is fairly unrealistic, as it is merely supposed 
to represent the ultimate upper limit. 
The exact figures in table 3 are based on the following logic: 
Extrapolating the last available full year ADM data16 to 2008 with a yearly 
increase of the aforementioned 4.9%, we would arrive at 12.6 minutes of 
ADM for arrivals. Compared to the figures from 2004 (10.4 minutes ADM), 
this represents an absolute increase of around 2 minutes per flight by 2008. 
This figure is indicated in the table for level 2 airports as the most likely 
scenario. Based on the aforementioned findings another 2 minutes of delay 
per flight were added for level 3 airports (i.e,. 4 minutes in total) since hub 
airports tend to show higher levels of delays. These additional 2 minutes for 
hubs are fully consistent with the results of the study by Mayer & Sinai 
(2003) which indicate a range of 1.5 to 4.5 minutes of extra delays per 
arriving flight at hub airports.17 
The most important analysis in respect to profitability is to test the 
percentage of flights which are not filled above the break-even load factors. 
As described above we suggest break-even load factors for A380 operations 
to be in the region of 70% or 385 passengers respectively. Therefore the 
percentage of unprofitable flights is: 
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Furthermore, we calculate the average percentage of passengers missing 
their A380 flight: 
 
                                                 
16  Calculations are based on CODA Annual Report 2004. It expels 10.4 minutes 
ADM for arrivals which represents an increase of 4.9% compared to 2003 (CODA, 
2004). 
17  Although the study is mainly based on US domestic traffic data, there is evidence 
that the findings are at least in tendency applicable to European feeder networks. 
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The average load factor (L) for the A380 is: 
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RESULTS 
 Figures 1-3 reveal the simulated distributions for the chosen A380 
flights. The expected break-even barrier was graphed accordingly, showing a 
certain number of losses for the airline due to incidental delays. Table 4 
shows the statistics for these three flights. 
The results demonstrate that delays have a significant effect on the 
profitability situation of an airline. We can observe that there was a large 
discrepancy between expected demand and simulated transferring passengers 
from feeder carriers for all three flights. The average percentage of feeder 
passengers not being able to transfer is high in the status quo scenario with 
13.42% for PEK, 13.94% for NRT and 9.49% for LAX. Since these figures 
represent today’s congestion levels, this situation also applies to current 
jumbo operations with lower passenger numbers. Since flights are still 
generally profitable, compared to the break-even barrier of 385 passengers, 
the airline might not consider this situation sufficiently threatening to be 
willing to make structural changes to wave design or to take other actions. 
The existing delay consequences might be accepted as a type of background 
white noise. 
However, this situation changes as we apply different congestion 
scenarios. Out of the three flights, two of them, FRA-to-NRT and FRA-to-
PEK, would experience considerable losses in the most likely and worst case 
scenarios. For FRA-to-NRT, our results indicate that 12.78% of all flights 
would fly with less than break-even load factors in the most likely scenario 
while for FRA-to-PEK this figure stands at 19.04%. This would possibly 
question the overall success of these flights. For FRA-to-LAX, however, this 
is not the case. Although to a large extent feeder flights and therefore the 
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resulting delays are also the same for FRA-to-NRT, the distribution of 
passengers from the feeding flights for this destination seems to ensure 
reliable results with respect to the simulated load factor. Therefore, we find 
that the timing of important feeders at incoming waves proves to be a crucial 
issue for successful operation of intercontinental flights. 
The simulation results for the three routes indicate that delays at the hub 
airport FRA might harm the profitable operation of the A380 in the year 
2008. The status quo scenario already shows fairly high discrepancies 
between expected demand and transferring passengers for all observed 
flights. We also see that a further worsening of delays in the upcoming years 
would result in a very questionable financial operation of A380 flights with 
today’s existing wave patterns. Therefore, airlines as well as infrastructure 
operators and policymakers will have to pay greater attention to delays than 
they have done in the past. 
 Figure 1. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Tokyo-Narita International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs) 
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Figure 2. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Los Angeles International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
 
Figure 3. Simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International Airport to 
Beijing Capital International Airport, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
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Table 4. Analysis of simulated distributions of A380 flights from Frankfurt International 
Airport to 3 destinations, projections for 2008 (5000 runs)  
 Basic scenario Most Likely Worst Case 
 TOKYO-NARITA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (NRT) 
Mean 408.13 397.36 392.65 
Load factor (L) 74.20 % 72.25 % 71.39 % 
Standard Deviation 10.971 10.671 11.232 
Kurtosis -0.1395 -0.2561 -0.3122 
Asymmetry -0.2781 -0.2593 -0.1931 
Min 363.26 357.46 356.24 
Max 439.28 422.37 421.49 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  2.30 % 12.78 % 25.38 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  13.94 % 17.68 % 19.42 % 
 LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (LAX) 
Mean 422.05 412.57 408.53 
Load factor (L) 76.74 % 75.01 % 74.28 % 
Standard Deviation 8.017 8.167 8.607 
Kurtosis 0.0440 0.0928 0.2436 
Asymmetry -0.3425 -0.3971 -0.3587 
Min 385.07 376.07 362.62 
Max 444.12 434.23 431.20 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  0.00 % 0.20 % 0.78 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  9.49 % 12.90 % 14.25 % 
 BEIJING CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (PEK) 
Mean 402.44 392.22 385.77 
Load factor (L) 73.17 % 71.31 % 70.14 % 
Standard Deviation 8.847 8.153 7.135 
Kurtosis -0.1820 -0.1673 -0.0719 
Asymmetry -0.0260 0.0183 -0.0508 
Min 369.49 364.05 356.70 
Max 430.14 417.79 407.08 
Unprofitable 1ˆc  2.28 % 19.04 % 45.92 % 
Missed connection 2cˆ  13.42 % 17.82 % 20.41 % 
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DISCUSSION 
Implications for further research 
In order to counteract the significant effects of air traffic delays, we 
suggest several domains of action. Some aim to reduce the impact of delays 
on airline operations and others aim to reduce the delays themselves. 
The first option would be to improve the schedule so as to make it more 
resilient to delays, that is, reducing the direct implications of delays on the 
hub-and-spoke operations. This could be accomplished by spreading the 
feeder traffic. A disadvantage of this measure, however, is the increase in 
travel time for preferred flights and thus a possible loss of demand. 
Slot swaps of feeder flights could also provide substantial 
improvements. It is important here to know which flights could be shifted 
within the current wave pattern. Going back to the empirical results, we can 
observe different delay distributions for each feeder flight. One possible 
solution would be to pre-schedule those feeder flights which are delayed in 
most cases but which are also important due to their feeding passenger 
volume. Another solution could be to reschedule the departure of the A380. 
These solutions obviously depend on slot availability at the origin airport as 
well as at the destination airports. 
Airlines can also try to shift feeding traffic to alternative modes of 
transportation that is usually not affected by air traffic delays, although close 
cooperation with the involved airports is necessary. LH’s AIRail approach 
can serve as a prime example (Fakiner, 2005). 
A different approach to mitigating the delay issue is to reduce delays 
themselves. Critics of the air traffic control system claim that its current 
capacity shortage is responsible for the dramatic delay situation. They 
demand a coordinated European solution to the problem. In 2004, however, 
airlines were also responsible for a certain share of the delays recorded by 
CODA. Possible solutions are streamlining the operations and the relocation 
of hub activities to less congested airports (e.g., LH established Munich as 
secondary hub besides its primary anchor FRA).18 Finally, the airports might 
need to invest in additional terminal and runway capacity to enable them to 
handle additional passengers in the future. Although regulatory restrictions 
in most European countries hinder the introduction of innovative methods to 
use existing capacity more efficiently (e.g., alternative slot allocation 
schemes), all involved parties need to address this issue intensively. 
Irrespective of the problems caused by delays, the deployment of large 
feeder aircraft to meet the additional demand generated by the A380, in 
particular, causes further problems for airports and airlines. Both need to 
                                                 
18  Problems associated with this option are a lower number of transfer passengers at 
the primary hub and in many cases lower yields at the secondary hub. 
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ensure the compliance with the minimum connecting time despite increased 
passenger volumes. Moreover, this strategy requires the airlines to invest in 
larger feeder aircraft or to cooperate more closely with feeder airlines 
operating adequate aircraft. Considering these additional financial 
investments as well as the increased bargaining power of related feeder 
airlines, it may turn out that operating an A380 is associated with some 
hidden costs which also need to be taken into account. 
Given the problems of hub-and-spoke systems introduced here, we have 
to ask whether the original hub-and-spoke model is still the adequate type of 
network structure for intercontinental airline operations. By subjecting the 
A380 to the financial test, it is revealed that the A380 requires quite 
favorable conditions for its profitability. 
 
Limitations 
Our method might be criticised for disregarding the correlation between 
the delays of feeder flights. In reality, however, it is likely that the delay of 
one flight has an impact on subsequent flights. 
Furthermore, bad weather conditions are likely to result in delays for the 
entire feeder wave. This limitation had to be taken into account, however, as 
available data did not make it possible to compare delays of the same days 
and thus the ability to adjust the correlations in the distribution. Moreover, 
we see a limitation in the missing translation of empirical distributions into 
inferential distributions. However, the elimination of outliers would not play 
a significant role here. 
CONCLUSION 
We used the case study of LH at FRA to simulate the consequences of 
feeder delays for the success of the new mega airplane A380 which will fly 
from FRA as early as 2008. As a first step, we took today’s wave patterns of 
jumbo operations and applied demand forecasts for each O/D pair to the 
chosen destinations. Our simulation of A380 load factors was then based on 
past delay distributions for relevant feeders. 
The results demonstrate that delays are extremely detrimental to the 
profitable operation of the A380 since a fairly high percentage of feeder 
carriers do not arrive on time to transfer their connecting passengers. We 
indicated that the status quo delay scenario might not be considered so 
harmful to the airline as the flights are usually operated above break-even 
load factors. Our analysis, however, revealed that a further increase of delays 
would result not only in a significant loss of profitability but could also 
threaten overall profitability for two of the three simulated routes. Thus, LH 
would have to reconsider their current scheduling pattern to take into 
account possible escalation of flight delays in the future. 
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We suggested two main options with which the airline may counteract 
these developments. First, a spread of feeder operations, which would, in 
turn, result in an increase in overall travel time. Second, a close monitoring 
of feeder delays could lead to rescheduling options within the existing wave 
patterns. The latter option is particularly relevant to voluminous feeder 
flights likely to experience delays on a regular basis. 
Further research might broaden the context of this study by explicitly 
examining possible consumer and competitor responses and changes in 
market demand due to a change of pricing structures with the introduction of 
the A380. 
In conclusion, delays seem to be one of the major issues which will 
concern the airline industry in the future; not only for airlines operating large 
hub-and-spoke systems but also for infrastructure operators and 
policymakers. Since the introduction of the A380 is imminent, pre-emptive 
action from all participants is required. 
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